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Abstract
This paper applies the theory of Communicating Se
quential Processes CSP to the modelling and analysis
of a nonrepudiation protocol Nonrepudiation proto
cols dier from authentication and keyexchange pro
tocols in that the participants require protection from
each other rather than from an external hostile agent
This means that the kinds of properties that are re
quired of such a protocol and the way it needs to be
modelled to enable analysis are dierent to the stan
dard approaches taken to the more widely studied class
of protocols and properties A nonrepudiation proto
col proposed by Zhou and Gollmann is analysed within
this framework and this highlights some novel consid
erations that are required for this kind of protocol
 Introduction
Over the past few years formal methods have been
successfully applied to the analysis of security pro
tocols The bulk of the eort has been concerned
with authentication and condentiality properties and
there are now a range of maturing techniques and ap
proaches for such analysis as exemplied in 	 and
in 
     

 
	 Nonrepudiation 	 has not
been addressed to the same degree by these techniques
and it is the aim of this paper to consider how the CSP
approach presented in 	 extends or adapts to the anal
ysis of this property
Nonrepudiation protocols are used to enable agents
to send and receive messages and provide them each
with evidence so that neither of them can successfully
deny at a later time that the message was transmitted
Each participant aims to collect evidence that could
later be shown to a judge to prove that the other party
 
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did send or receive the message as appropriate A
protocol designed to achieve this is generally required
to provide the property of correctness of the evidence
that the evidence really is strong enough to guarantee
what the holder requires of it
In some cases the protocol might also aim to pro
vide fairness that no party should be able to reach
a point where they have the evidence or the message
that they require without the other party also having
their required evidence Fairness is not required for
nonrepudiation 	 but it may be desirable in some
cases The protocol considered in this paper aims to
provide fairness
Evidence is generally in the form of signed messages
which provide guarantees concerning their originator
In the design of such protocols fairness is the more
dicult property to achieve and various schemes have
been proposed to try to achieve this The problems
and proposed solutions are discussed in 
	 Firstly
the sender and the recipient do not involve any other
parties and gradually release information to each other
over many rounds of a protocol so that they eectively
obtain the evidence and the message together as a grad
ual process Secondly a trusted third party can be in
volved in a protocol to handle some of the evidence
The problems and proposed solutions are discussed in
more detail in 
	
In contrast to authentication and keyexchange pro
tocols nonrepudiation protocols are not concerned
with communication in the presence of a hostile agent
between two parties who trust each other Instead
they are employed when a communication is required
between two agents who require protection from each
other and who do not entirely trust each other to be
have honourably in the future They are typically
proposed in the context of a passive communication
medium which cannot be manipulated by either party
or by other agents but which may nevertheless have
some unreliable behaviour
In analysis the system must be modelled from the
point of view of a judge who would be used to arbi
trate in the case of a dispute Correctness is concerned
with whether a judge who cannot know a priori which
agents are honest must accept evidence as guarantee
ing that the message was sent This concerns the na
ture of evidence an agent might himself know that a
message was sent and yet not be in a position to prove
this to the judge
The CSP modelling reveals an aspect of non
repudiation unusual for a security property Most secu
rity properties are safety trace properties essentially
that nothing bad a breach of security should happen
at any stage In the case of the protocol considered
in this paper some of the aspects of nonrepudiation
involve liveness as well as safety For example the evi
dence that A collects does not guarantee that B has in
fact received the message but it does guarantee that
the message must be available to B  Nonrepudiation
can require that certain additional activities ought to
be possible
This paper is organised as follows the CSP notation
is briey introduced and the ZhouGollmann protocol
is then introduced This protocol and the system re
quired for analysing it are modelled in CSP The mod
elling is similar to the approach taken in 
	 though
the descriptions of the component processes are dier
ent to reect the dierent property that is being anal
ysed The CSP specication and verication of the
system description are then introduced The results
concerning the required properties of the system are
all presented The proofs were carried out by hand
they are not all included here for reasons of space and
readability there are essentially two kinds of prop
erty safety achieved via rank functions and liveness
achieved by considering liveness of the components
A sketch is provided for each kind of proof
 CSP notation
CSP is an abstract language designed specically for
the description of communication patterns of concur
rent system components that interact through message
passing It is underpinned by a theory which supports
analysis of systems described in CSP It is therefore
well suited to the description and analysis of network
protocols For a fuller introduction to the language and
the semantic models the reader is referred to 	
In CSP systems are modelled in terms of the events
that they can perform The set of all possible events
xed at the beginning of the analysis is denoted 
Events may be atomic in structure or may consist of a
number of distinct components or elds An example of
events used in this paper are those of the form c i  j  m
consisting of a channel c a source i  a destination j
and a message m
Processes are the entities that are described by CSP
expressions and they are described in terms of the
possible events that they may engage in The output
cv  P is able initially to perform only c v  the out
put of v on channel c after which it behaves as P  The
input cx  T  Px  can accept any input x of type
T along channel c following which it behaves as Px 
Its rst event will be any event of the form c t where
t  T  The process P   Q pronounced P choice Q 
can behave either as P or as Q  its possible commu
nications are those of P and those of Q  An indexed
form of choice
 
i I
P
i
is able to behave as any of its
arguments P
i

Processes may also be composed in parallel If D is
a set of events then the process P jD 	jQ behaves as P
and Q acting concurrently with the requirement that
they have to synchronise on any event in the synchro
nisation set D  events not in D may be performed by
either process independently of the other Interleaving
is a special form of parallel operator in which the two
components do not interact on any events it is written
P jjj Q  and is equivalent to P jfg 	jQ  There is also
an indexed form
jjj
i I
P
i

Processes may also be recursively dened by means
of equational denitions
The traces of a process P  tracesP is dened to
be the set of nite sequences of events from  that P
may possibly perform Examples of traces include the
empty trace hi and hin  out   in i which is a pos
sible trace of the recursive process COPY  inx 
out x  COPY  If a is an event and tr is a trace then
a in tr means that a appears in the trace tr 
The failures of a process P  failuresP is dened
to be the set of tracerefusal pairs tr X  that P can
exhibit where tr is a trace and X is a set of events that
P can refuse to participate in after some execution of
the sequence of events tr  Examples of failures include
the empty failure hi  which is possible for any pro
cess and hin  out   in i fout  out  g which is a
possible failure of COPY 
Availability or liveness on events can be deduced
from the set of failures of a process for example if tr is
a trace of a process P  and a  X for any failure tr X 
of P  then a cannot be refused after performance of tr 
and so it must be available
Safety specications are given as predicates on
traces and a process P satises a specication S tr if
all of its traces satisfy S tr
P sat S tr   tr  tracesP  S tr
Liveness specications are given as predicates on
failures and a process P satises a specication
S tr X  if all of its failures meet that predicate
P sat S tr X   tr X   failuresP  S tr X 
 The ZhouGollmann protocol
The full ZhouGollmann nonrepudiation protocol is
described in 
	 The aim is for A to send a message
M to B  and for the parties to obtain evidence that
the message was sent and received The message M
is transferred in two stages an encrypted form is rst
sent directly to B under some key K  and after A has
received evidence of receipt from B  the key K itself
is sent via a trusted third party TTP The trusted
third party makes the key available via ftp and both
A and B have the responsibility to retrieve the key and
the evidence that it was deposited by A
Agent B should not be able to extract M until both
of these messages have been received
A cut down version of the protocol with the un
signed parts of the message omitted is described as
follows

  A B  s
A
f
NRO
B LC 
  B  A  s
B
f
NRR
ALC 
  A TTP  s
A
f
SUB
B LK 
  B  TTP  s
T
f
CON
AB LK 
  A TTP  s
T
f
CON
AB LK 
Zhou and Gollmann explain the elements of the proto
col as follows
 A originator of the nonrepudiation exchange
 B  recipient of the nonrepudiation exchange
 TTP  online trusted third party providing net
work services accessible to the public
 M  message which is to be sent from A to B 
 C  commitment ciphertext for message M  eg
M encrypted under a key K  The point is that C
in itself is not enough to identify the message M 
but that C together with K is
 K  message key dened by A
 L is a label used to identify a particular protocol
run It should be unique to a single protocol run
 f
NRO
 f
NRR
 f
SUB
and f
CON
are ags used to iden
tify the step of the protocol in which a particular
message was generated
 s
i
is a private signature key known only to its
owner i  and s
T
is TTP s private signature key
The steps of the protocol are explained as follows

 With the rst message A sends a signed combina
tion of C  K M  a label L and the recipients
name B  B will use this as evidence that K M 
was sent in a run identied with L
 B responds with a signed record that C has been
received in run L This will provide evidence for
A that K M  was received
 A then sends the key K to the trusted third party
together with the label L If A tries to cheat by
sending the wrong key then he will not obtain the
evidence he requires since K M  and K

will not
convince the judge that M was sent
   Each of A and B can retrieve by means of an ftp
get a signed record from TTP that the key K as
sociated with protocol run L has been deposited
Responsibility for retrieving this information rests
with the agents themselves to nullify a possible fu
ture claim that the message was never received
Thus both A and B can obtain evidence that the
key K was made available to B 
The TTP only needs to handle relatively small mes
sages and make them available by ftp so this protocol
is appropriate even if the messages themselves are ex
tremely large since TTP never has to handle them
directly
At the end of the protocol run if A wishes
to prove that the message has been received he
presents s
B
f
NRR
ALC  and s
T
f
CON
AB LK  to
the judge the rst piece of evidence conrms that B
received C  and the second piece conrms that the key
was deposited with the TTP  which means that B has
access to it and hence to the message The label L in
both pieces of evidence connects the two items K and
C as being associated with the same protocol run
If B wishes to prove that the message was sent he
presents both pieces of evidence s
A
f
NRO
B LC  and
s
T
f
CON
AB LK  to the judge the rst provides
evidence that C was sent and the second provides ev
idence that K was also sent to the TTP 
In 
	 there is a detailed informal analysis of the
protocol with regard to both its correctness properties
that the evidence guarantees what it is supposed to
and its fairness properties that no party has an ad
vantage at any stage This paper is concerned with
providing a more formal analysis
Throughout this paper the protocol will be referred
to as the ZG protocol
3.1. CSP modelling
CSP will be used to model and analyse this protocol
This forces the assumptions underlying the protocol
and its expected properties to be claried
Dierent properties will be associated with dier
ent points of view and these may require alternative
models of the system for their analysis In particular
correctness of the evidence is from the point of view
of the judge it concerns the conclusions that a judge
can draw from the particular evidence presented before
him even though he has not witnessed the purported
run of the protocol himself
On the other hand fairness with respect to obtain
ing evidence will be the concern of the individual agents
involved in the run and they are only entitled to expect
fairness if they follow the protocol faithfully
Hence an analysis of correctness of the evidence
must be considered from the point of view of the judge
who may be presented with evidence from some party
The judge is entitled to make some assumptions con
cerning each of the parties in particular that they do
not divulge their secret keys but cannot assume that
they have accurately followed the steps of the protocol
On the other hand an analysis of fairness for any
particular agent will need to model that agent as cor
rectly following the protocol The judge is not directly
concerned with fairness that is more the concern of
the agents themselves and agents can know that they
have followed the protocol even if they are unable to
convince the judge of this
3.2. The architecture
Any CSP model of the system will have to include
the two participants in the protocol who will be la
belled A and B  and the trusted third party TTP  It
is also reasonable to allow the presence of other agents
who are potential protocol participants since the pro
tocol is expected to be correct even in the presence of
other users of the network
Communication between the agents is generally
achieved by sending and receiving messages The mes
sages are not guaranteed to arrive and they can arrive
in any order This is best modelled by an explicit pro
cess MEDIUM whose description contains all of the
behaviour expected of it The transmission of mes
sages from agents will be modelled by a CSP channel
trans the event trans i  j  m means that agent i trans
mits a message m to agent j  Similarly the receipt of
a message is modelled by use of the CSP channel rec
the event rec j  i  m indicates receipt by j of message m
from i 
A
trans.TTP
B
TTP
MEDIUM
ftp.A ftp.B
rec.TTP
evidence.A evidence.B
trans.A
rec.A
rec.B
trans.B
Figure 1. Network for a non-repudiation pro-
tocol
Communication is also possible via ftp between the
agents and the trusted third party This is a synchro
nisation between the two participants and is modelled
by the channel ftp the event ftp i  TTP  m indicates
that i receives m from TTP by means of an ftpget
Finally the agents have an evidence channel which
they use to present evidence to a judge
The entire network is the parallel combination of
these components
NETWORK 

jjj
i USER
AGENT
i
INIT
i
 j ftp 	jTTP
j trans rec 	j
MEDIUM  
This is illustrated in Figure 

Having established the architecture of the system it
is now necessary to model the behaviour of the various
components
3.3. The medium
The medium provides an unreliable message delivery
service sending a message does not guarantee that it
is received and messages might be lost
The attempt to explicitly model the medium raises
a number of issues concerning the degree to which
the medium is unreliable it must be decided whether
messages can be delivered to the wrong destination
whether they can arrive apparently from someone other
than the genuine sender and whether messages can be
come altered in transit It is also necessary to consider
whether messages can be delivered to more than one
destination and whether they are removed from the
medium once they are delivered Finally the potential
loss of messages should be considered
We will rstly assume that messages cannot alter
in transit This amounts to the assumption that any
corrupted messages will be detected and disposed of
by the medium!such messages will be treated as if
they had become lost Deliberate altering of messages
in order to attack the protocol must be carried out by
other agents
We will also have to assume that messages cannot be
delivered to the wrong address This assumption will
be discussed later!it is needed for one of the fairness
properties FAIR

If the protocol can be veried with such a medium
then it is equally correct over a better behaved com
munications network It means that agents can have
condence in the protocol even if they do not have con
dence in the medium to deliver messages accurately
This medium is dened most naturally in two
clauses
 If the medium is empty then it can do nothing
but accept messages
MEDIUM   
transijm MEDIUM fi  j mg
 If the medium is not empty M    then it can
either accept messages deliver them or nondeter
ministically lose them
MEDIUM S  
transijm MEDIUM S 	 fi  j mg
 
 
 i j  m S
ec j i m 
MEDIUM S n fi  j mg
u
u
 i j  m S
MEDIUM S n fi  j mg
The argument S is the set of messages in the
medium
Messages
The medium itself is ready to accept and pass on any
kinds of messages However in order to model the
agents themselves and what they can do it is necessary
to tie down more precisely what kinds of messages can
circulate in the system This approach was used in 
	
and is explained more fully there
The original informal description of the protocol in
dicates that the message space contains at least ags
labels names of users keys text and combinations of
these The set of messages MESSAGE can be given by
the following contextfree grammar
RAW  FLAG j LABEL j USER
j TEXT j KEY
MESSAGE  RAW j KEY MESSAGE 
jMESSAGE  MESSAGE
 The set FLAG contains f
NRO
 f
NRR
 f
SUB
 and
f
CON

 The set USER contains A B  and TTP  as well
as other users
 The set KEY  SECRET j PUBLIC j SHARED
contains a secret key s
i
 SECRET for each
i  USER and s
T
 SECRET which is TTP s
secret key these are used for signing messages
in the protocol in this paper For each secret
key s
i
it also contains a corresponding public key
p
i
 PUBLIC  Furthermore KEY contains other
keys SHARED used in the protocol to encrypt
text
 Elements of MESSAGE are either raw or else en
crypted messages or else concatenated messages
A generates relation 
 indicates when new messages
m may be generated from a set of already known mes
sages S  It is dened by the following clauses
 m  S  S 
 m
 S 
 m  S  S

 S


 m
 f  FLAG    
 f
 l  LABEL   
 l
 i  USER    
 i
 k  KEY m  MESSAGE  fk mg 
 km
 s
i
 SECRET  p
i
 PUBLIC m  MESSAGE 
fs
i
m p
i
g 
 m
 s
i
 SECRET  p
i
 PUBLIC m  MESSAGE 
fp
i
m s
i
g 
 m
 sh  SHARED m  MESSAGE  fsh shmg 

m
See 
	 for a discussion of this relation
3.4. The protocol participants
We are now in a position to model the agents po
tentially involved in the protocol run
The judge aims to verify that the evidence presented
is strong enough to establish nonrepudiation even un
der the possibility that either or both of the partici
pants have not behaved in line with the protocol and
also that some other agents may have become involved
In general an agent is able to send anything over
the network that can be generated from the informa
tion already in that users possession However it is
important to assume that the agents do not divulge
their secret signing keys The agent i can send out
all messages that can be generated through 
 and can
also sign messages with s
i

The igenerates relation 

i
is thus dened by the
following two clauses
S 
 m  S 

i
m
S 

i
m  S 

i
s
i
m
From the point of view of the judge who can directly
observe only the evidence that appears on the evidence
channels all the possibilities of an agents behaviour
should be considered
The behaviour of an arbitrary user of the network
is therefore described by the CSP process description
AGENT
i

AGENT
i
S  
 
j USER S
i
m
trans i j m  AGENT
i
S 
  rec ijm  AGENT
i
S 	 fmg
  ftp i  TTPm  AGENT
i
S 	 fmg
 
 
S
i
m
evidence i m  AGENT
i
S 
An agent with information S is able to send any mes
sage that can be generated from S  and can also present
any such information as evidence It can also receive
any message m which will augment S  either from the
medium or else by an ftpget The ftp channel is dis
tinct from the medium It models direct synchronous
communication between the TTP and an agent
Observe that the way we have modelled AGENT
i
means that it is always ready to accept messages along
ftp i  TTP 
Lemma 
AGENT
i
S  sat ftp i  TTP  m  X
 
This corresponds to the assumption that the judge
must make makes that any agent is always able to
retrieve messages along the channel ftp
For deniteness the originator of a protocol run will
be AGENT
A
 and a responder will be AGENT
B
 In
other words a judge might be faced with some evidence
on evidence A claiming that B received a message or
with evidence on evidence B claiming that A sent a
message The descriptions of both of these agents are
instances of the generic AGENT
i

The denition of AGENT
A
allows for the possi
bility of A executing the protocol correctly provided
INIT
A


A
L INIT
A


A
K  and INIT
A


A
M  In other
words the ZG protocol is contained in AGENT
A
s pos
sible executions and the protocol need not be given
explicitly
Similarly the process AGENT
B
INIT
B
 is able to
execute the responders part of the protocol From the
point of view of appropriateness of the evidence no
assumptions are required concerning what AGENT
B
is or is not able to generate
Other agents may also be present in the network
3.5. The trusted third party
The trusted third party described by process TTP
accepts signed messages of the form of step  of the
protocol and makes them available via ftp The judge
has to assume that the trusted third party acts in ac
cordance with its role in the protocol It is therefore
modelled as follows
TTPS   rec Tjs
j
f
SUB
 b l  k
 TTPS 	 fs
T
f
CON
 j  b l  kg
 
 
j USER m M
ftp j  TTP  m
 TTPS 
The trusted third party guarantees that any mes
sages retrieved from it via ftp correspond to receipt
of an appropriately signed f
SUB
message in accordance
with the protocol This is formalised in the following
lemma
Lemma 
TTP  sat ftp i  TTP  s
T
f
CON
 j  b l  k in tr
 rec TTP  j  s
j
f
SUB
 b l  k in tr
 
Secondly TTP meets a liveness property once a
message has been provided by ftp to some agent i then
it will always be available to any agent i


Lemma  For any i and i


TTPS  sat ftp i  TTP  s
T
f
CON
 j  b l  k in tr
 ftp i

 TTP  s
T
f
CON
 j  b l  k  X
 
 Specication and verication
Specication of Nonrepudiation of Origin
NRO
The nonrepudiation of origin property requires that
B s evidence provides a guarantee that A sent some
particular message In particular it should provide
the guarantee that A sent a message to B containing
the label L and the ciphertext C  K M  and another
message intended for B containing the same label L and
the key K  these two messages are taken to establish
that A sent M to B 
Expressed in terms of CSP traces we require that
if both s
A
f
NRO
 B  L C  and s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K  ap
pear in the trace on evidence B  then both messages
s
A
f
NRO
 B  L C  and s
A
f
SUB
 B  L K  must have been
sent by A along trans A
The evidence cannot guarantee that A transmitted
those messages in accordance with the protocol!they
might have been sent as components of other messages
Hence the formal trace specication is given by
NROtr  evidence B  s
A
f
NRO
 B  L C  in tr
 evidence B  s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K  in tr
 A sent s
A
f
NRO
 B  L C  
A sent s
A
f
SUB
B LK 
and the requirement on the system is that
NETWORK sat NROtr
In the denition of NRO  A sent m allows for the pos
sibility that m is contained within some other message
that was transmitted by A
Definition 
i sent m  M MESSAGE  j  USER 
trans i  j  M in tr
M contains m
 
where the contains relation is dened as follows
Definition  For all messages m m

 and m

 and
keys k 
 m contains m
 m

contains m  m

 m

contains m
 m

contains m  m

 m

contains m
 m

contains m  km

 contains m
 
4.1. General properties of the network
In order to establish particular nonrepudiation
properties it is benecial rst to establish some general
properties of NETWORK which will be useful
Many properties are of the form R precedes T  for
sets of events R and T  in the sense that if some event
from T occurs in a trace then some element from
R must appear earlier in the trace Such specica
tions have been studied in the form of authentication
properties and there is a welldeveloped theory using
rank functions for establishing such properties for sys
tems such as NETWORK  Informally for the network
given in this paper we aim to nd a rank function
 MESSAGE Zsuch that
 every component of the network the agents the
trusted third party and the medium when pre
vented from outputting R maintains positive rank
ie if only messages of positive rank are input
then any output message must have positive rank
In order to check this for the agents each gen
erates relation 

i
must be checked to establish
that if every member of S has positive rank and
S 

i
m then m has positive rank
 Every message in T has rank  or less
If such a rank function can be found then nothing in
T can occur unless something in R occurs previously
The rank function approach is discussed more fully in

	 and is used in this paper without further discus
sion It will be illustrated in Lemma  the other re
sults established using rank functions will be presented
without proof for reasons of space
The key property is that signing provides the re
quired assurances!that if a message is signed by s
i
then agent i must have sent it This is of the form R
precedes T  where T is the set of messages in which a
message signed with s
i
is received and R is the set of
messages in which it is sent by i 
The property is used in two forms one for when
evidence is presented and one for when a message is
received by another agent

u  



t  



p
i
  



s
i
 
 
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 i

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 

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s
j
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Figure 2. Rank function for Lemma 4.3
Lemma  For any message m if i  j and i  TTP 
then
NETWORK sat
evidence j  s
i
m in tr  i sent s
i
m
 
Proof Fix the message asm

and the signing agent as
i

 If i

is blocked on sending any message containing
m

on trans and evidence i

 then the rank function
in Figure  has the required properties  
Definition 
j received m  M MESSAGE  i  USER 
rec j  i  M in tr
M contains m
 
Lemma  For any users i and j  and any message
m
NETWORK sat j received s
i
m i sent s
i
m
 
This is also proved using the rank function in Fig
ure 
The trusted third party is used to provide evidence
to the various parties The only signed evidence TTP
provides is via ftp
Lemma  For any message m if j  TTP  then
NETWORK sat
evidence j  s
T
m in tr 
 h  ftp h TTP  s
T
m in tr
 
This is also established with an appropriate rank func
tion
It need not be j himself that retrieved the message
directly from TTP since some other agent h might
have retrieved the message and passed it on to j  But
some party must have retrieved the message from TTP 
Corollary 	
NETWORK sat
ftp i  TTP  s
T
f
CON
 i  j  l  k in tr
 i sent s
i
f
SUB
 j  l  k
 
Proof This follows from Lemmas  and  with
TTP as the receiving agent  
TTP provides a guarantee that i sent the appropriate
signed message
Lemma  and Corollary  are needed for both
nonrepudiation of origin and nonrepudiation of re
ceipt both parties need evidence that the key was de
posited and hence that the other party had access to
it
4.2. Correctness of evidence
Verication of Nonrepudiation of Origin
NRO
Each piece of evidence that B obtains corresponds to
a dierent message that A can be proved to have sent
Lemma  with a particular instantiation for m
yields for the rst piece of evidence that
NETWORK sat
evidence B  s
A
f
NRO
 B  L C  in tr
 A sent s
A
f
NRO
 B  L C 
Lemma  and Corollary  together establish for
the second piece of evidence that
NETWORK sat
evidence B  s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K  in tr
 A sent s
A
f
SUB
 B  L K 
These two results together mean that NETWORK
satises the conjunction of the specications which to
gether imply NROtr Hence as required
NETWORK sat NROtr
Verication of Nonrepudiation of receipt
NRR
Nonrepudiation of receipt states that if the messages
S
T
f
CON
 A B  L K  and S
B
f
NRR
 A L C  appear on
evidence A then B must have received some message
containing C  and also K is made available by the
TTP  Thus B has eectively received K and C  and
knows them to be linked because of the label L
Unlike the case of NRO which is concerned with
guaranteeing that messages have been sent there is no
guarantee that all of the messages have actually been
received by B by the time A presents the evidence We
therefore formulate NRR in part as a liveness speci
cation requiring that the messages must at least be
guaranteed to be available to B  In fact the evidence
does guarantee that B s rst message was sent so the
liveness is concerned only with the availability via ftp
of the message deposited with the TTP 
NRRtr X  
evidence A s
B
f
NRR
 A L C  in tr
 evidence A s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K  in tr
 B sent s
B
f
NRR
 A L C 
 ftp B  TTP  s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K   X
In order for NETWORK to guarantee that some event
e  X  all the participants in the event e must
be willing to perform it In the case of the event
ftp B  TTP  s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K  the participants are
B and TTP 
The assumptions built into the modelling of
AGENT
B
yielded the result that AGENT
B
sat
ftp i  TTP  m  X  as given in Lemma 

Lemmas  and  together with the fact that
AGENT
B
is live on the channel ftp i  TTP all estab
lish that
NETWORK sat
evidence A s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K  in tr
 ftp B  TTP  s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K   X
Furthermore similarly to its use in the verication
of NRO  Lemma  with a particular m establishes
that
NETWORK sat evidence A s
B
f
NRR
 A L C  in tr
 B sent s
B
f
NRR
 A L C 
These two results together combine to yield
NETWORK sat NRRtr X 
4.3. Fairness
Having established that the evidence does achieve
what is intended we can now address fairness
considerations!each partys access to the evidence
Fairness in nonrepudiation protocols is concerned
with the relationship between the gathering of evidence
by the involved parties A protocol is unfair if one
party can obtain the evidence he requires before the
other party is able to do so Such an imbalance makes
it possible for the party in the advantage to stop par
ticipating in the protocol at that stage Furthermore
the party receiving the message must not be able to
access it and know what it contains until the sender
has the evidence of receipt if B has M  then A has
the NRR evidence
An agent is only entitled to expect fairness if he
behaves in accordance with the protocol For example
agent A could send the key K to B along with the
rst message In this case B will be able to access the
message before A has the NRR evidence but A has
forfeited any right to complain by failing to behave in
accordance with the protocol
Thus the fairness requirements for agent A require
a dierent modelling of AGENT
A
 one in which he be
haves in accordance with the protocol Modelling of
other agents remains as before since A has no guaran
tees about their behaviour and wishes to be assured
of fairness even if they misbehave Similarly the fair
ness requirements for AGENT
B
require that agent to
be modelled in accordance with the protocol with the
other agents as before
The agent A running the protocol will then be de
scribed as follows
PROT AGENT
A

trans AB s
A
f
NRO
 B  L C 
 rec A B  s
B
f
NRR
 A L C 
 trans ATTP s
A
f
SUB
 B  L K 
 ftp A TTP  s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K 
 FINISHED
A
 s
B
f
NRR
 A L
s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K 
The process FINISHED
i
describes the result of running
the protocol the two pieces of evidence are ready to
be presented
FINISHED
i
e f  
evidence i e  FINISHED
i
e f 
  evidence i f  FINISHED
A
e f 
Once A has run through the protocol and reached
FINISHED
A
 then the two pieces of evidence are ready
to be presented
Similarly agent B running the protocol is described
as follows
PROT AGENT
B

rec Bis
i
f
NRO
 B  L C 
 trans B i s
B
f
NRR
 i  L
 ftp B  TTPs
T
f
CON
 i  B  L K 
 FINISHED
B
s
i
 f
NRO
 B  L C 
s
T
f
CON
 i  B  L K 
It is clear that each party might not have all the ev
idence when the other does since they might not yet
have obtained the last piece of evidence from the TTP
via ftp What we require is that they have unhampered
access to the evidence Each AGENT
i
 once they have
performed their ftpget will be in a position to oer this
nal piece of evidence This is an assumption rather
than a requirement of the network and it may be con
rmed to hold of the individual agent descriptions as
follows
AGENT
i
sat
ftp i  TTP  m in tr  evidence i  m  X
and hence
NETWORK sat
ftp i  TTP  m in tr  evidence i  m  X
In other words the users in the network are able to use
whatever they obtain via ftp on their evidence channel
Hence if a particular piece of information m is avail
able via ftp to user i in the description NETWORK 
then this provides that user with the access to m Thus
for fairness it is sucient to require only thatm is avail
able via ftp
ftp i  TTP  m  X
The communication ftp i  TTP  m should not appear in
the refusal set X 
A user is thus considered to have access to a piece
of evidence either if it is already in their possession or
else if it available via ftp The description of the proto
col indicates that the NRR and NRO evidence should
already be in each participants possession by the time
the other has nished the run and that the evidence
provided by the TTP should be made available to each
of them
Fairness for A concerning message receipt
Firstly we consider the case where B should not know
what the message M is until proof of receipt has been
provided to A If B is able to provide the message M
along its evidence channel say then A must have
proof of receipt This can be expressed as a liveness
requirement
FAIR
tr X  
evidence B  M in tr

ftp A TTP  s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K   X
 evidence A s
B
f
NRR
 A L C   X
 evidence A s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K   X 
A may not actually have obtained the evidence via ftp
but must at least be in a position to do so The way
PROT AGENT
A
is dened A is not ready to provide
any evidence until the ftp event has occurred
The proof obligation is that
PROT AGENT
A
jjj 
jjj
i A
AGENT
i

j ftp 	jTTP
j trans rec 	jMEDIUM
sat FAIR
tr X 
and this is established along the lines of earlier proofs
The crux of the proof is that B cannot obtain the keyK
until it is provided by TTP  Thus for this property it is
necessary to assume that none of the agents apart from
A initially knows the key K  The key is sent out by
A exactly once to TTP  so no other party will receive
that message until TTP gives it out This relies on the
model of the medium as delivering messages accurately
this is discussed further in Section 
Fairness for B obtaining evidence
Secondly if A has proof of receipt then B must be in
a position to obtain proof of origin
FAIRtr X  
evidence A s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K  in tr
 evidence A s
B
f
NRR
 A L C  in tr

ftp B  TTP  s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K   X
 evidence B  s
A
f
NRO
 B  L C   X
 evidence B  s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K   X 
This specication states that if A is able to present
the evidence concerning NRR then B must either be
able to provide the evidence concerning NRO or be in
a position to obtain it
The proof obligation here is that
PROT AGENT
B
jjj 
jjj
i B
AGENT
i

j ftp 	jTTP
j trans rec 	jMEDIUM
sat FAIRtr X 
and this is straightforward to establish
Fairness for A obtaining evidence
Conversely if B has proof of origin then A should have
proof of receipt
FAIRtr X  
evidence B  s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K  in tr
 evidence B  s
A
f
NRO
 B  L C  in tr

ftp A TTP  s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K   X
 evidence A s
B
f
NRR
 A L C   X
 evidence B  s
T
f
CON
 A B  L K   X 
The proof obligation here is that the network with
A executing the protocol should satisfy FAIRtr X 
	 Discussion
In this paper we have considered a particular non
repudiation protocol and analysed it both with respect
to correctness of the evidence and with respect to fair
ness to the participants The hope has been to extract
some general understanding of how to model and anal
yse nonrepudiation protocols from this particular ex
ample The specications that were formulated were
necessarily inuenced by the protocol itself

 Correctness of evidence A kind of authentica
tion property that requires that if various pieces
of evidence e

     e
m
are in the possession of an
agent then some other messages m

     m
n
must
have been sent in the case of NRO or received
or been made available in the case of NRR to
some other agents
 Fairness A property requiring that if the mes
sage being sent or the various pieces of evidence
e

      e
m
appearing in an authentication require
ment of type 
 are in the possession of the ap
propriate agent then the other party should also
have access to the evidence that he requires
The rst of these properties is a concern of every non
repudiation protocol the second is a property that is
in desirable in some cases though it is not an essential
aspect of nonrepudiation protocols
Unusually for security properties some of these
properties are formulated in terms of liveness and so
not only traces but also refusals of the system need to
be considered for such properties
Curiously the verications of the correctness of ev
idence properties are carried out without reference to
the protocol at all but only with respect to the ca
pabilities and assumptions concerning the participat
ing agents On reection this is appropriate since the
judge cannot know that either party has carried out
the protocol These properties are concerned with the
nature of evidence rather than with how the parties dis
tribute it The verication also means that the parties
cannot collude to fool the judge though in any case
it is not clear why they would wish to since such be
haviour has already been considered within the general
description of the processes
The process of modelling and verifying the protocol
and the network in CSP revealed a number of issues
that were not immediately obvious For example I rst
attempted to verify the FAIR properties with the orig
inal general descriptions of the agents This attempt
failed because there was no guarantee that the agents
would not send some message to undermine their own
fairness requirement One possibility is that agent A
could send the rst and the third message of the pro
tocol without waiting for the response from B  In this
case B will receive the message and the evidence but
A will not It thus became clear that the fairness prop
erties should only be veried for agents that faithfully
follow the protocol which is obvious in hindsight but it
is comforting to know that the analysis process forces
this point to become explicit
The other issue that became revealed by the mod
elling process concerned the medium my original de
scription of the medium did allow for the possibility
of messages being delivered to parties other than the
intended recipient a message trans i  j  m put onto
the medium could result in a delivery rec k  l  m to a
completely dierent agent k  and apparently from an
other agent l though this last aspect does not cause a
problem All the properties concerning the evidence
NRO NRR FAIR and FAIR remain true even with
this less reliable medium but the property FAIR
 does
not hold because the third step of the protocol which
reveals key K to TTP  can be misdelivered to B and
never reach TTP  This will allow B to read the mes
sage M without A obtaining the evidence he requires
If the protocol is required over this kind of medium
then it would make sense for A to provide the third
message of the protocol to TTP by means of an ftp
put In fact it does not matter if B can listen in on
such a communication provided it can be guaranteed
that TTP also receives it
The use of an ftp server in a nonrepudiation proto
col is a novel idea introduced by Zhou and Gollmann
and it is not clear how easily the CSP analysis of this
protocol would generalise to other nonrepudiation pro
tocols It seems likely that the CSP properties which
capture nonrepudiation would also apply naturally to
other protocols which involve trusted third parties but
it is less clear whether an analysis of a two party multi
pass nonrepudiation protocol would show up dierent
issues and perhaps require a dierent approach to spec
ication This is a topic for future research
In summary modelling and analysing this protocol
in CSP has helped to clarify issues concerning the pro
tocol and its context and has enabled a formal state
ment of the specication claimed for the protocol and
corresponding verication
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